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Constitutional Legacies of Empire in Politics and Administration: Jamaica’s Incomplete 
Settlement 
It is widely acknowledged that formal constitutional rules matter. They are critical for deciding 
winners and losers in society. They represent ‘the principle that the exercise of political power shall 
be bounded by rules, rules which determine the validity of legislative and executive action by 
prescribing the procedure according to which it must be performed or by delimiting its permissible 
content.”1. It is similarly widely acknowledged that informal institutions matter for offering 
interpretive guidance as to the meaning of constitutional rules. And, it is also widely recognised that 
the colonial inheritance of constitutional principles has had a significant effect on subsequent post-
colonial political, economic and social development. 
So far, so bland. How is it then that political systems post-independence move from a period of 
initial constitutional acceptance to turmoil over constitutional principles? To answer this question, 
this paper explores how the absence of an informal understanding regarding the tension between 
two fundamental constitutional principles of the Westminster system represents the true British 
colonial legacy in one critical colonial case, namely Jamaica. It does so by focusing on the pre-and 
immediate post-independence period up to the late 1970s. Focusing on Jamaica offers for the 
investigation of the informal underpinnings of formal constitutional settlements that emerge in 
colonial and colonial settings. The paper argues that the lack of informal understandings as to how 
to address the tension between responsible and representative forms of government led to the 
presence of a mutually suspicious bargain between national political and administrative classes in 
the post-independence period.  
In highlighting the importance of the colonial legacy of (the absence of) informal constitutional 
understandings, this paper contributes to a number of strains in the literature regarding the impact of 
colonial legacies (and constitutionalism within these legacies). One strain points to the question as 
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to how to ‘transfer’ or ‘transplant’ constitutions and policies from one geographical place to 
another, given the importance of the endogenous effects of institutions that make the outcomes of a 
transfer of institutions from one setting to another highly uncertain.2 A second strain, represented by 
Acemoglou and Robinson’s seminal Why Nations Fail, notes how extractive political institutions 
complement extractive economic institutions in placing little-constrained discretionary powers in 
the hands of a small elite.3 Such colonial inheritance, as represented by a plantation-based economy 
such as Jamaica’s, is said to stand in the way of the type of inclusive political and economic 
institutions that support subsequent development. A third strain focuses on the constitutional effects 
of colonial rule specifically. For example, Matthew Lange noted how British colonial rule had 
attracted both positive and negative commentary as to its impact on subsequent (post-colonial) 
political and economic development.4 Lange emphasises the importance of the ‘direct’ rather than 
‘indirect’ form of colonial government in establishing essential administrative infrastructures for 
subsequent development. Such potentially positive effects of direct rule could be circumvented by 
unfavourable conditions during time of political transition, Lange argued, highlighting the case of 
ethnic conflict and cold war politics in Guyana as example.  
The following account of Jamaica’s colonial legacy finds considerable change in constitutional 
understandings over time. The case of Jamaica is one of a (broadly) consensual political transition 
in a two party system, yet, we find the disintegration of a broad political consensus in the 1970s 
which revealed the unresolved nature of shared understandings given constitutional principles. By 
arguing that the true colonial legacy of the Westminster inheritance is a lack of informal agreement 
on constitutional principles, this paper also resolves a continuing paradox in the literature on 
Jamaica itself, namely the tension between a literature that points to the transition of constitutional 
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principles (and its functioning) in the immediate post-colonial period and a subsequent literature 
that has sought to highlight the dysfunctional characteristics of the Westminster transplant in view 
of a national style of politics that is sometimes characterised in terms of patron-client relations.5 
To illustrate this argument in light of the colonial legacy of constitutionalism, this paper focuses on 
one central tension inherent to the context of Westminster systems, namely the tension between 
doctrines of responsible and responsive government.6 More specifically, this paper focuses on how 
this tension is translated into understandings regarding the appropriate role of the civil service in 
terms of loyalty and competence understandings. This paper argues that for political (and 
economic) development to occur, there needs to be a presence of a ‘mutually beneficial’ bargain or 
understanding to navigate formal ambiguities over constitutional rules. Instead, we find, in the case 
of Jamaica, a colonial legacy of absent mutually beneficial bargains between political and 
administrative elites. The bargain that emerged may instead be characterised as ‘mutually 
suspicious’.  We argue that the lack of informal understandings can be traced back to ambiguities in 
colonial governance and unresolved controversies over constitutional principles in the immediate 
transition to independence period. The lack of a supportive, or ‘complementary’ informal 
understanding regarding the tensions over ‘how to govern’ subsequently were at the heart of 
emerging conflict in the immediate independence period. 
Constitutionalism, responsible and representative government 
The colonial legacy of constitutionalism goes beyond the very general commitment to restraining 
the behaviour of those in political power and setting out procedures for decision-making.  Informal 
understandings need to be ascertained that fill the formal constitutional rules with content: it is 
about the interpretations of constitutional rules and how constitutional principles are brought to life 
in every day conduct. The critical importance of informal aspects of constitutionalism relates to 
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areas of uncertainty, areas where observed ‘facts’ require translation into existing constitutional 
understandings. These informal understandings emerge in particular settings; they also matter when 
it comes to areas of tension between constitutional principles. For any form of stable constitutional 
rule to exist, requires a broad degree of informal acceptance as to the appropriate boundaries 
between these competing principles. In other words, informal understandings (or institutions, as 
defined by Helmke and Levitsky7) shape how formal institutions work, how they are reinforced or 
undermined. For comparative politics scholars, informal institutions often operate side-by-side of 
formal institutions, such as systems of patronage or clientism. In this paper, we focus on a particular 
set of informal understandings, namely those understandings that give meaning to formal 
arrangements, for example by guiding interpretations in inevitable cases of ambiguity regarding the 
meaning of formal arrangements. In doing so we follow the historical institutional tradition: How 
institutional rules are to be operated and understood requires a degree of understanding as to the 
appropriate zone of agreement and disagreement regarding constitutional principles that are in 
inherent tension with each other. The need for informal understandings underpinning formal 
arrangements is not unique to constitutions: every relationship may be regarded as an ‘incomplete 
contract’, thereby requiring understandings and conventions’. However, such informal 
understandings and conventions are rarely written down, their origins are often in dispute, they are 
open to disagreement, if not cheating, and they reveal contrasting emphases on particular principles 
that should govern the informal understandings underpinning a formal constitution.  
To explore this argument, this paper focuses on the inherent tension in the so-called Westminster 
system between principles of responsible and representative government. In the context of the 
Westminster system, the main features have been defined as: 
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a constitutional system in which the head of state is not the effective head of government; in 
which the executive branch of government is parliamentary inasmuch as Ministers must be 
members of the legislature; and in which Ministers are collectively and individually 
responsible to a freely elected and representative legislature.8  
 
One fundamental tension within this constitutional setting of the Westminster system lies between 
the ideas of responsible and representative government. In the legal literature, at the core of 
responsible government is the duty of Ministers to account to a democratically elected body. 
Roberts-Wray, for example, defines responsible government as ‘a system of government by or on 
the advice of Ministers who are responsible to a legislature consisting wholly, or mainly, of elected 
members; and this responsibility implies an obligation to resign if they no longer have the 
confidence of the legislature’.9 Underlying this particular conception of responsibility lies a view 
that ministers should have, as Birch puts it, ‘sufficient independence to pursue consistent policies 
without permitting them to forget their obligation to keep in step with public opinion’.10 Yet, as 
Birch further argues, this is only one of several meanings of responsibility within British 
constitutional thought, coming second in terms of priority to the primary understanding of 
responsibility as consistency, prudence and leadership.11  A third conception of responsibility as 
responsiveness to public opinion and demands has, he argues, still lower priority.12  
In contrast with responsible government, the idea of representative government seems to have no 
defined meaning in British colonial law, except as an ‘inapt and confusing’13 synonym for a 
representative legislature. In a broader sense, however, the idea of representative government is an 
essential part of the British tradition of constitutionalism, one which incorporates elements of 
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distinct political traditions, including a commitment to the independence of Members of Parliament, 
the link between MPs and local constituencies, and, perhaps most importantly, a concentration of 
political power within an elected chamber which fairly represented all the interests of the country.14  
In its core understandings, therefore, doctrines of responsible government are in potential tension 
with those of representative government: The idea of responsible government emphasises the 
importance of ‘prudence’ over excessive political accountability and direct input of the public. The 
idea of representative government, in contrast, emphasises the control of political decisions by 
elected representatives acting in a directly and immediately responsive mode to interests of their 
constituents and the country as a whole. These tensions are not just reserved for Westminster type 
systems. In the contemporary European context, for example, the late Peter Mair diagnosed a 
decline of a form of democracy that combined constitutional and populist elements: ‘the democracy 
of elections as well as checks and balances, and the democracy of mandates, popular accountability, 
representative government’15 Instead, he argues, an emphasis on responsibility and managerialism 
had crowded out the earlier focus on responsiveness to constituents’ changing preferences. The 
tension between responsible and representative government will arguably always be present to 
some degree, and political conflict over these tensions is, in essence, a reflection of a wider (non-) 
acceptance of initial constitutional settlements. 
Such conflicts between notions of responsible and representative government are also at the heart of 
colonial and post-colonial experiences. In fact, Jamaica (and elsewhere in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean) has been characterised by a distrustful accommodation between these two rival notions. 
We explore this conflict between demands for representation and responsibility in the context of 
one central constitutional relationship that characterises the Westminster model, namely the 
relationship between politicians and public servants. To illustrate how such an informal 
accommodation within this relationship in view of the two notions of responsible and representative 
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government succeeded, one can point to New Zealand (a ‘dominion’ in terms of colonial 
governance arrangement). There, Leslie Lipson noted how a successful accommodation between 
politicians and civil servants provided a stable basis for this ongoing relationship:  
With the political parties the modern [New Zealand] civil service has struck a mutually 
beneficial bargain. By guaranteeing to public servants a life’s career and a pension, parties 
have foresworn the use of patronage and have guaranteed to the state’s employees their 
tenure of their jobs. In return the parties expect, and the public servants owe, equal loyalty to 
any government which the party have placed in office.16  
Such an accommodation has been essential in New Zealand, as it has in the United Kingdom, to 
resolving the tensions between responsible and representative government.17 In terms of responsible 
government, the privileged role of a permanent civil service in the management of public affairs 
provided prudence and leadership, and especially consistency in an electoral system in which 
parties alternate in power. Serial loyalty to ministers, and traditional civil service anonymity 
underpinned doctrines of ministerial accountability, while also ensuring responsiveness to public 
opinion through vis the electoral system. Despite still emphasising doctrines of responsibility over 
representativeness, Lipson’s ‘mutually beneficial bargain’ also accommodated a degree of 
representativeness, not only through shifting allegiance to the political programmes of popularly 
elected governments of different stripes, but as a result of the self-denial by politicians of patronage 
powers over through the establishment of a professional, permanent civil service.  
Such a mutually beneficial bargain will always be open to challenge and changing societal contexts 
may mean that some parties may regard the bargain as no longer mutually beneficial. For example, 
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in the context of understandings of civil service neutrality, Kingsley argued (in the case of the UK) 
that this aspect of responsible government was based on somewhat fragile foundations:  
The convention of impartiality can only be maintained when the members of the directing 
 grades of the Service are thoroughly committed to the larger purposes the State is 
attempting to serve; when in other words, their views are identical with those of the  
dominant class as a whole.18 
The rest of this paper explores how unresolved ambiguity and tension over interpretations between 
trade-offs over constitutional principles of representation and responsibility, such as those noted by 
Kingsley above, translated into the area of the the public service. As the notion of ‘mutually 
beneficial’ bargain highlights, for informal understandings regarding formal constitutional 
arrangements to persist, all parties to this (often mythical) bargain need to be broadly supportive 
and regard it as beneficial to its particular interests. It is the absence of a mutually beneficial 
bargain over the tension between responsible and representative government of the ‘Westminster 
model’ that characterised the constitutional evolution of Jamaica pre- and post-independence. 
Instead what shaped the constitutional evolution was the presence of a mutually suspicious bargain 
in which the post-independence political elite was suspicious of the loyalty and competency of the 
administration, whereas the latter was suspicious of calls for greater representativeness in 
government, as these represented challenges to both understandings of ‘appropriate’ governing and 
challenges to social privilege.  
More generally, therefore, institutions of responsible government in particular were viewed with 
suspicion in the post-colonial context of newly emergent political elites with a different 
understanding of the role and purposes of the state in the era of independence, and for who claimed 
the backing of the people for the policies they sought to implement. In Jamaica, and, more 
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generally, the former West Indian territories, the public service was no longer seen to be 
‘representative’ in Kingsley’s sense of faithfully reflecting the new dominant interests in society. In 
addition, it was also argued to lack autonomy. In societies in which plantation and extractive 
industries prevailed, there was the absence of an emerging commercial class. Instead, a ‘derivative 
middle class’ emerged in the Caribbean whose dependence on political beneficence meant that the 
underlying source of autonomy and responsibility had to be conformist to the political government 
of the day.19 In other words, the institutional and social configuration which mediated between the 
competing demands of responsibility and representation in the cases of the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand were almost entirely lacking in Jamaica and the wider the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
Therefore, ideas regarding appropriate forms of responsible and representative government, and the 
balance between these forms, and the particular commitments underlying them, have fuelled, and 
have been amplified by the political tensions and cleavages in Jamaica (and other jurisdictions of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean). If there is a colonial legacy in terms of constitutionalism in Jamaica 
and the Commonwealth Caribbean, then it lies in the unresolved contestation between fundamental 
constitutional principles, such as about forms of responsible and representative government. More 
generally, such a lack of informal understandings and thus lack of support for a broader 
constitutional settlement puts into place a trajectory of constant opposition to the formal rules of the 
constitution, undermining any legitimacy of the constitutional settlement in itself. To develop this 
argument, the rest of this paper first considers the ambiguity of constitutional principles that were 
inherited from the times of colonial government. 
Crown Colony Rule and its Legacies 
Any interrogation into the nature of constitutionalism in the context of post-colonial government 
needs to start with the colonial period. This is not just because this was the period in which the 
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independence-era constitution was written; it was also the period where the dominant informal 
understandings about responsibility and representation were established and consequential aspects 
of the relationship between politics and administration took shape. In the following section, we 
highlight the strong formal emphasis on responsibility that characterised the Crown colony 
arrangement that defined the government of Jamaica in colonial times. However, we also note how 
non-mutually beneficial these arrangements were, creating the conditions for the unresolved nature 
of the tension between constitutional principles.   
The Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, later described by The Times as “one of the most acute public 
controversies of the nineteenth century,”20  was a watershed moment in Jamaica’s constitutional 
history. For present purposes, the significance of the Rebellion, and the bloody response of the 
British authorities was that it led directly to the replacement of its seventeenth century constitution 
(known as the ‘old representative system’) and its replacement by Crown colony administration. In 
fact, constitutional relations between the Governor and the Assembly had long been dysfunctional,  
and Governor Eyre had previously, but with limited success success, sought the support of the 
Colonial Office for a new constitution. The Assembly now willingly, albeit in a moment of panic, 
surrendered its ancient powers.  
From a legal point of view, such as that expressed by Roberts-Wray, the expression Crown colony 
can be seen as lacking in precision. The term, he said, was ‘sometimes freely used with a degree of 
confidence which is hardly justified, for it is difficult to say precisely what it means’.21 From the 
internal point of view of those responsible for the administration of the Crown colonies, the term 
acquired a much more specific understanding. Charles Bruce quoted, in glowing terms,22 a despatch 
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of the Duke of Buckingham, Secretary of State for the Colonies  between 1867–68  in which the 
latter argued that constitutions adopted in the West Indies from 1865, ``whilst more or less different 
from each other in their component parts,  have one feature in common—that the power of the 
Crown in the Legislature, if pressed to its extreme limit, would avail to overcome every resistance 
that could be made to it.”23  
In the case of Jamaica, this was accomplished through a set of constitutional arrangements that 
placed responsibility for all matters on the Governor. Appointed by the Sovereign on the 
recommendation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he was, as Colonial Office Regulations 
put it, “single and supreme authority, responsible to, and representative of His Majesty.”  
Bruce describes the reality of the Governor’s position in the following terms:  
the governor is not in the position of a constitutional sovereign; he is actual ruler. He, and he 
alone, is responsible for the conduct of  the local affairs of the colony. He is responsible to 
the Home Government, while his advisers are responsible to him, and not, as in a self-
governing colony to to the local legislature.24  
 
Similarly, Barnett describes the role of the Governor in the following terms: 
By virtue of his control of the Legislative Council, ultimate legislative as well as executive 
power vested in him, he alone could initiate financial measures and all legislation was 
subject to his assent. He had the right to appoint judicial and public officers whom, subject 
to the overriding powers of the Secretary of State at will. He was responsible only to the 
Colonial Office and was the sole channel of communication with the British Government.25 
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Crucial to these observations are the subordinate position of advisory bodies—in formal terms, the 
Executive Council and the local legislature, the Legislative Council—as well as the Colonial 
bureaucracy headed by the Colonial Secretary. These include strong elements of representation and 
constraints on (at least, formal) local elected representation. Until 1884, there was no elective 
element to the Legislative Council. Instead, its members consisted of ex officio members (including 
the Colonial Secretary who presented the Government’s business in the Council, as well as the main 
colonial Heads of Department) and nominated members appointed by the Governor.26  After that 
year, an element of representation was introduced, in the form of nine elected members, increased 
to fourteen in 1895. The increase in elected members was balanced by an increase in official and 
nominated members to five and ten respectively, ensuring the the government side had a bare 
majority.27 
An executive Privy Council (more commonly,  ‘Executive Council’) consisted of the Governor as 
President, the Colonial Secretary, Financial Secretary and the Attorney General, as well as two 
nominated officials appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Governor. It was 
possible for an unofficial (i.e. nominated or elected) member of the Legislative Council to serve on 
the Executive Council. This was, according to Hamilton, “a high privilege for the unofficial 
member, as it enabled him to participate in the business of policy making.”28 He further notes, 
however, that a frequent criticism among members representing labour interests was that, “the 
appointment of unofficial members to the Executive Council was limited to representatives of the 
employer class.”29 
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As well as enabling the Governor and his administration, these constitutional arrangements also 
served—to some extent—to limit criticism and insulate the Governor from accountability. Although 
formally accountable via the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State, to the Crown,  distance and 
unfamiliarity with local conditions meant that Colonial Office doctrine emphasised the discretion of 
the “man on the spot”: the idea that colonies were under the control of Downing Street was 
regarded as “the one rank heresy we all shudder at.”30 He was protected in the Legislative Council 
not only by the support of official and nominated members who were expected to support the 
Governor in their votes and their debate contributions, and by the paramount importance clause, but 
in financial matters by a “quasi-spoils system” that seemed to give greater priority to the 
constituency needs of those elected members who voted with the Government.31  
Such insulation was never complete, however. Despite disavowals of rule from London, particular 
instances of defiance or mismanagement of governmental affairs could provoke outrage in 
Whitehall and Westminster, and in British society more generally, as we noted in the case of the 
Morant Bay Rebellion.32 This had to be balanced against criticism from local interests, who voiced 
their opposition in the local press. As Hamilton puts it,  
Invariably he needed the agility of a tight-rope walker. Any action inimical to the 
identifiable metropolitan interests could raise a storm of protest about his head. On the other 
hand, it was equally vital that he not provoke local interests to the point where peace and 
tranquility were disturbed.33 
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Insulation of the bureaucracy from local interests was always somewhat selective, and depended on 
the degree of visible support towards metropolitan interests. As the West India Royal Commission 
(The Moyne Commission) subsequently  put it:  
[T]he governor is not an autocrat, inasmuch as… he and his administration are open to 
influence; the complaint most frequently heard is, rather, that Governments are dominated 
by vested interests and that only the representatives of such interests are successful in 
exercising their influence.34 
Moyne’s analysis was supported by Hamilton’s study of Jamaican administration on the eve of 
independence which noted a pronounced class (and consequently ethnicity-based) distinctions. 
Hamilton noted the informality, and indeed deference, with which members of the bureaucracy 
dealt with members of their own social class, in contrast with their superordinate position in relation 
to members of the general public who were expected to stand outside the barricades and wait their 
turn.35  
In its constitutional structure Crown colony rule in theory therefore represented the ultimate 
emphasis on responsible government, in the foremost sense of consistency, prudence and 
leadership, while consciously rejecting understandings relating to accountability towards a 
legislative body or responsiveness to local public opinion. This was justified by an ideology of 
wardship or trusteeship which emphasised on the one hand that the duty of the Colonial 
administration to balance the different class and ethnic interests, and on the other that this must be 
accompanied by sufficient powers to carry out that trust.   
The practice arguably fell far short of this idea. For example, Harold Laski, writing on the eve of 
the 1938 disturbances, complained that the word ‘trusteeship’, was   
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…too flattering to the results obtained. It is hardly compatible with the historic incidence of 
the facts. It is a word whose sound is too noble for the squalid results too often attained; for, 
in many cases, whether the test taken be standard of life, public health, education, or growth 
of fitness for self-government, the colonies remain, in large degree, the slums of empire.36 
Laski blamed this state of affairs partly on a narrow approach to recruitment, which included failing 
to develop the talents of "educated coloured people”37, as well as a preference for ‘sound men’ 
rather than ‘innovators’. Compounding this situation was the Treasury’s determination to run an 
empire ‘on the cheap’.38 A series of official reports from the 1920s through to the 1940s point to the 
persistence of low salaries, poor recruitment practices, an inadequate physical working environment 
for civil servants.39 Senior civil servants were overloaded by excessive workloads, including for 
some attendance in the Legislative Council for as many as a hundred days per year, while junior 
officers exhibited little initiative, passing matters for decision up to their superiors, while busying 
themselves with what Edwin Jones would later tern “administrivia”.40 The result, as seen locally 
was that “the bureaucracy exhibited incapacity for technical programmes as distinct from routine 
operations.”41  
The reality of responsible government was therefore less about consistency, prudence and 
leadership, but rather largely about maintaining law and order and ensuring economic production. It 
barely included extensive understandings of development and welfare understandings only emerged 
in the 1930s and 1940s in response to trade union movements, riots and evidence of widespread 
under-development. These concerns, as well as the ability of existing constitutional arrangements to 
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respond to them, were exposed by the disturbances of 1938, and laid bare in the Moyne Report 
whose findings and conclusions were largely kept from the public eye in order not to fuel potential 
opposition to colonial rule during the Second World War. 
To recap, several things are worth emphasising. First, Crown colony rule was able to operate 
without the necessity of any ‘mutually beneficial’ understandings between politicians and civil 
servants. The Colonial administration, in particular the expatriate officers who occupied senior 
positions enjoyed an exalted position in related to elected members of the legislative Council. 
Moreover, the colonial system successfully monopolised local officers’ loyalties, due to the peculiar 
nature of the class structure of colonial society.42 Frustrated though they may have been, their 
loyalties were completely bound up with the metropolitan interests and institutions. Secondly, many 
of the features that were later to be associated with the political sociology of post-Colonial 
Jamaica—including the fragility of the position of the government, despite its apparent power, 
relations between the bureaucracy and sections of the public that were patron–clientelistic, the 
absence of technical skills to carry out programmes of social and economic reform, and the 
concentration of decision-making authority at the apex of governmental structures —were already 
to be found in barely concealed form in the unresolved tensions within Crown colony government.      
The Path to Independence 1944–1962 
In less than twenty years, between 1944 and 1962, Jamaica transitioned from Crown colony rule 
with a minority of elected representatives in its Legislative Council to a fully independent 
Commonwealth state with a Westminster-style constitution. It is not fanciful or fallacious to see 
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imitative, lopsided and frustrated: “It was derivative in the sense of being derived from colonial occupation 
rather than by natural evolution. It imitated some of the characteristics of the colonial rulers functionally and 
to establish rapport. It was lopsided because there was no corresponding economic middle class of 
distributors, retailers, servicemen and rentiers to balance this professional salaried class… Finally, it was 
frustrated economically because there was less and less scope for employment in a stagnant colonial 
economy; politically as the class was denied the share it demanded in governing and in administrative 
positions, and socially a members of the class were rebuffed from entering the social circles and clubs of the 
colonial rulers.”  
  
each of the intermediate steps as staging posts towards independence. Indeed, Colonial Office 
policy during this time embraced the doctrine of  ‘preparation’, the training of local populations ‘for 
the self-government and independence which British policy intends that they should achieve in as 
short a time as is reasonably possible’.43 Nevertheless, we should not make the mistake of assuming 
that, in its particulars, Jamaica’s path of constitutional development towards independence was 
planned from the outset.  
The 1938 crisis marked a sea-change in the public opinion in Jamaica—and indeed in the wider 
Caribbean. Popular unrest had long been a feature of West Indian societies, but the disturbances of 
1938 were, as the West India Royal Commission put it, “a phenomenon of a different character, 
representing a mere blind protest against a worsening of conditions, but a positive demand for the 
creation of new conditions that will render possible a better and less restricted life.”44  Against this 
observation, two aspects of the Moyne Commission’s recommendations stand out.  
First, was the Report’s embrace of the need for a far-reaching programme of social welfare. This 
followed earlier acceptance by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies (Sidney Webb, Lord 
Passfield)  who noted that the poor social conditions in the colonies represented a ‘reproach to our 
colonial administration’.45 These were radical and far-reaching recommendations, notwithstanding 
their burial deep within the structure of the Moyne report,46 nor criticism that they were founded on 
out of date assumptions about West Indian society.47 In particular, the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act 1940, passed in response to the Moyne Commission recommendations, accepted the 
 
43 Robertson SJ, ‘Some Problems on the Path to Self-Government’ (1961) 39 Public Administration 313, p. 
313. 
44 Moyne Report (n 34) Cap I para. 17 (p. 8). Reporting in 1939, the Moyne Commission presented such a 
damning picture of British Colonial Rule in the West Indies that it was suppressed until 1945 for fear of the 
propaganda value to Germany of its contents. A summary of recommendations was published in 1939.  
45 Cabinet Office papers CAB21/809, held in The National Archives, Kew.  
46 As Simey puts it, proposals for welfare reform were “…tucked away as an appendage to an other 
recommendation dealing with administrative machinery, and this is buried in a sub-section labelled ‘Other 
needs and Services’, attached in its turn as an afterthought to the section of the Recommendations dealing 
with administrative reforms in the social services.” See T S Simey, Welfare and Planning in the West Indies, 
(Clarendon, 1946), 233. It should nevertheless be noted that the Report’s executive summary that was 
published in 1939 condemned ‘with a sense of shame’ the ‘situation that now exists’.  
47 Ibid.  
  
principle of the UK Treasury’s responsibility for the welfare and development of its colonial 
subjects. This followed the unification of the colonial civil service in 1930 which also intended to 
encourage the recruitment of civil servants capable of planning and development. 
A second noteworthy feature of the Moyne Report was that it placed constitutional and 
administrative reform at the heart of its recommended response to the `West Indian question.’ 
Social regeneration was ‘not possible under the present form of government’. And it recognised, 
though it fell short of endorsing, the strength of West Indian sentiment that a more expansive role 
for the colonial government in social and economic policy in turn meant that far from being 
antagonistic ideals, responsible government depended on a greater degree of representation than the 
mid-nineteenth conception of trusteeship allowed.   
 Rightly or wrongly, a substantial body of public opinion in the West Indies is convinced  
  that far-reaching measures of social reconstruction depend, both for their initiation 
and    their effective administration, upon greater participation of the people in the 
business of    government.48  
The Moyne Commission, for its part, was willing to contemplate greater representation through 
variation in the composition of Legislative and Executive councils.49 However, it cautioned against 
‘any fundamental change in the parts they play in the public affairs of those colonies’, insisting 
instead that, “The initiative in formulating policy should remain with the Governor in Executive 
Council’.50 
 
Moyne’s thinking was reflected in the Jamaican Constitution of 1944.51 A reformed Legislative 
Council became the upper house in a bicameral legislative structure; a newly created House of 
 
48 Moyne (n 29) Cap XXII, para 2. 
49 The Moyne Report noted the importance of ‘educating unofficial in the business of government’ (p. 375), 
requiring addressing the ‘inordinate’ length of speeches in the Jamaican Legislative Council, for example. 
50 Moyne (n 29) Cap XXII, para 4.  
51 Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1944, SI 1944/1215.  
  
Representatives, whose membership was elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, performed 
the functions of a lower chamber. Responsibility for making policy remained with Governors in 
Council, chaired as before by the Governor. Now, however, the House of Representatives could 
elect five of its members to serve on the Executive Council.52   
 
In formal terms, the civil service remained responsible, through the Colonial Secretary and the 
Governor to the Colonial Office, and ultimately the Crown. But as Byles put it, it was the voices of 
chairs of the five newly created Standing Committees of the House of Representatives, “which are 
now heard in the House in debates on the work of Departments—not the voices of the civil servants 
as was the case in the previous setup.”53 
 
A new constitution in 195354 created what Barnett called an “incipient cabinet system,”55 an 
intermediate step towards responsible government. This was effected through a change in the 
composition of the Executive Council, which was now to have a eight elected members: a ‘Chief 
Minister’ selected by the Governor and approved by the House of Representatives; and seven 
ministers with portfolio responsibilities selected by the Chief Minister. Ministries were created, and 
took on the functions formerly performed by the Colonial Secretariat, but the old Executive 
Departments continued at first, leading to tensions, especially in “technical” departments such as 
agriculture.56   
From a political (but not an administrative) point of view, these anomalies were addressed by the 
1959 Constitution, which established responsible government in the legal sense.57 A Cabinet was 
established “as the principal instrument of policy”, and its members were “collectively responsible” 
 
52 Elected members of the Executive Council were given the courtesy title of ‘Minister’, but had no portfolio 
responsibility. Sometimes they have been called “ministers in embryo”.  
53 G Louis Byles, ‘The Jamaican Experiment’ (1948) 56 Parliamentary Affairs 56, pp. 64–5. 
54 the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1953, SI 1953/747.  
55 Barnett (n 22), 18. 
56 Hamilton (n 23), 88–9.  
57 Jamaica (Constitution) Order 1959, SI 1959/862.  
  
to the legislature.58 While from a political point of view, the 1959 Constitution seemed to establish 
internal self-government, no provision was made for a change in control of the civil service, with 
the result, as Hamilton puts it, that “the control of the civil service under national government 
remained basically what it was under Crown Colony government.”59 
At the eve of independence, therefore, Jamaica had assumed the formal political institutions of 
responsible government. But despite the findings of the Moyne Commission that the appalling 
social and economic conditions that caused the 1938 disturbances were in part due to the “low 
standards of administration” practised in the colony, improvements during the post-war period were 
erratic, piecemeal and incremental.  While tensions were bound to arise in a new constitutional 
dispensation which civil servants for the first time expected to be responsive to the demands of 
politicians—and ultimately the public—the evidence seems to suggest that relations between 
elected representatives and civil servants were on the whole more cooperative than they had been 
before 1944.60 There are doubtless numerous reasons for this, but among them was that the Civil 
Service had been unable to recover from the loss of prestige it suffered as a result of the 1938 
disturbances, and was thus reliant on the legitimacy of elected national politicians. Equally, 
Alexander Bustamente, the leader of the Jamaica Labour Party, which had won the 1944 elections, 
was reliant on support from the Departments in the face of a virile opposition.  
Competence remained a challenge. Despite the acceptance by the legislature of of the Mills Report 
in 1950, the service remained rooted in routine, and was criticised for being unable to adapt to the 
expectations of Jamaicans of a service that would deliver material and social improvements in line 
with a growing economy.61 While it was a source of national pride that Jamaicans had begun to 
 
58 Jamaica (Constitution) Order 1959, s. 47.  
59 Hamilton (n 23), 92. 
60 Hamilton (n 23), 60; Barnett (n 22), 16–17. 
61 Indeed, Colonial Development and Welfare programmes had initially been administered outside of 
regular departmental lines, under the direction of the Comptroller of Development of Welfare and 
Development working in collaboration with the Colonial Office, with the local civil service acting only in an 
advisory capacity. 
  
occupy senior positions, the rapid loss of expatriate officers represented a loss of expertise in a 
system that had not proved effective in developing local talent..62 Pressure of work also increased, 
especially after the Peoples National Party took office following the 1955 elections and began to 
implement more administratively ambitious central planning measures. Against these expectation it 
was all too easy for politicians to interpret a lack of responsiveness as `sabotage’.  
Slowly but surely, however, the old hierarchy, which placed civil servants in an elevated position 
vis-à-vis elected representatives, began to invert itself. An early manifestation of this was that, as 
The observation in 1949 by Eric Mills, the Public Service Commissioner, that frankly expressing 
their views to politicians “may put at risk the career of any public servant”63 suggests that the 
situation developed rapidly in the half decade since the 1944 constitution was introduced. With the 
advent of the ministerial system, argues Hamilton: 
 The status [civil servants] enjoyed would largely be determined by the politicians whose  
 behavior would indicate to the people whether the civil service was accepted as the  
  bureaucratic arm of the executive or was seen in the relationship of master and 
servant in   the Jamaican context of low status for employees.64   
This, he argues, led to a situation in which the traditional status roles, “were reversed so that it was 
then the civil servants who tended to become sycophants.”65 
 
62 A partial exception can be inferred from Gladstone Mills’ observation that with the advent Colonial 
Development and Welfare funds a career the Treasury began to rival that of the Secretariat for prestige and 
influence. Since appointment in the Secretariat had been largely reserved to those in the top levels of colonial 
Jamaica’s ethnic-complexion hierarchy, this brought new opportunities for talented black Jamaicans to gain 
experience. He notes a number of notable individuals who served in the Treasury prior to 1944, adding that, 
“All would rise rapidly thereafter, and especially after the introduction of the 1944  
Constitution and of the Ministerial system in 1953. Gladstone E Mills Grist for the Mills, Reflections on a life, 
(Ian Randle, 1994), 60.  
63 Eric Mills, Report of the Commission on the Public Service in Jamaica (Kingston, The Government Printer, 
1949), para. 5.7; On the Mills Report see further Lodge et al (n  34), 21–3.  
64 Hamilton (n 23), 143. 
65 Hamilton (n 23), 146. 
  
Institutional measures were put in place to limit political control of the bureaucracy. The Public 
Service Commission Law 1951 placed matters of recruitment and promotion in the hands of a 
statutory board, the Public Service Commission. While this was intended as a measure to limit 
political patronage, the motivation may have been less about ensuring responsible government than 
about absolving the metropolitan government from complaints that it had abandoned the fate of 
expatriate officers to the hands of local political elites.66 In other words, they were a cheap way for 
the British government to ‘shuffle out’ of its implicit commitment to colonial civil servants.  
In sum, the period of Crown colony rule had emphasised (even if it did not always live up to) a 
concept of ‘trusteeship’ that saw local control over administration as an impediment to consistency, 
prudence and leadership. In fact, the absence of representative institutions had been irreconcilably 
associated in the public mind with serious failures of administration. Against this background, the 
post war period, with its emphasis on ‘preparation’, was notable in terms of its attempt to reconcile 
ideals of responsibility with a greater emphasis on representation. The period is important in terms 
of the emergence of political demands for as well as institutional configurations through which 
public servants were supposed to be responsive, through the legislature, to wider movements in 
public opinion in the territories. As seen from the Moyne report’s ambivalence on this point, this 
change of approach was not borne out of any great conviction that responsibility and representation 
could be reconciled given the state of political development of the West Indies, but out of a sense 
that the legitimacy of Crown colony rule had been shaken in a way that was irreversible within the 
existing constitutional framework.  
All in all, the civil service during this period was remarkable in its ability to act according to the 
ideal of neutrality, often in the face of accusations of ‘partisanship’ and ‘sabotage’. On the contrary, 
the administration often adopted an attitude of quiescence. Combined with the inability to overcome 
a colonial legacy of a service more comfortable with routine than innovation, and the design of 
 
66 Lodge et al. (n 39), 20–21.  
  
institutions that sought to reduce discretionary political decision-making by new political elites 
through creating new formal institutions, the picture that emerges is of a failure to design 
administrative institutions that could reconcile responsibility and representation. This was to prove 
highly problematic in terms of supporting the development of informal underpinnings of formal 
constitutionalisation in the post-independence period. 
The Post-Independence Period 
 
After the abortive experiment with West Indies Federation,67 which ended when in 1961 Jamaica 
voted in a referendum against participation in Federation, preparations began for the country to 
move towards independence on its own.68 While there were differences within the bipartisan 
committee which framed Jamaica’s independence constitution,  for the most part these did not 
extend to questioning the fundamentals of the political settlement that had been fashioned since 
1944. One cleavage was the extent to which the new constitution fettered the post-independence 
leadership, through the entrenchment of a Bill of Rights within the Constitution, as well as the 
entrenchment of the Public Service Commissions.69  
 
Outside of the then political elites, a more radical critique was emerging. In a final, posthumous 
contribution, the late Norman Girvan wrote of being part of a group of young scholars—some of 
whom  would later serve Michael Manley’s 1972–1980 PNP government—who rejected the 
fundamentals of the Westminster model as a basis for nation-building in the Caribbean.70 To Girvan 
 
67 British Caribbean  Federation Act 1956; The West Indies (Federation) Order in Council 1957, SI 1957/1364. 
68 Jamaica Independence Act 1962. 
69 Interestingly, some among the Jamaican political leadership fell on different sides of these issues. Edward 
Seaga for example opposed an entrenched Bill of Rights, but was in favour of clarifying the powers of the 
Service Commissions to protect public servants against some future leader who might be “willing to ransom 
an ounce of responsibility for a pound of political power.” Quoted in Patrick E Bryan, Edward Seaga and the 
Challenges of Modern Jamaica, (University of the West Indies Press, 2009), 89. 
70 Norman Girvan ‘Assessing Westminister in the Caribbean: Then and Now’ (2015) 53 Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics 95. 
  
and others like him, Jamaica’s constitution of 1962 was an ‘Independence Pact’ the purpose of 
which was to preserve the status quo after the end of British rule.  
 
We can see in these contrasting perspectives an emerging conflict between the idea that responsible 
government—particularly in its primary interpretation of consistency, prudence and leadership— 
depended on proper limits as to the policies that could be justified by reference to the popular will, 
and those who saw such limits as placing unjustifiable limits on the path that an independent, 
democratic Jamaica could chart for itself. The 1960s proved a benign environment inasmuch as the 
policies pursued by the JLP Government, first under Alexander Bustamante and then (from 1967) 
by Hugh Shearer did not significantly challenge the consensus between politicians and civil 
servants which for Kingsley were a precondition for civil service neutrality. Yet it is important to 
remember that the conditions that stabilised this compromise, would remain out of reach as long as 
civil servants were unwilling or unable to respond to the new political demands.  
 
In fact, signs of tension already existed for those who were perceptive enough to read the signs. 
Hamilton documents the severe shortage of skilled administrative expertise facing the government 
in independence, adding that: 
 
 Aware of the high praise showered on the Jamaica civil service in the past they fail to  
  comprehend ineptitude and so politicians of both parties have at sundry times 
suggested   deliberate sabotage on the part of civil service personnel.71  
 
For their part, civil servants were unable to respond to attempts by politicians to blame them for 
policy failures by restrictions on speaking publicly. Equally, though, he notes how civil servants, 
 
71 Hamilton (n 23), 193. 
  
accustomed to taking direction from Heads of Departments, resented what they regarded as 
Ministerial intrusion into their sphere of responsibility.72 
 
It was partly out of an awareness that these features of political–administrative interactions that the 
government invited the United Nations Technical Assistance Department to undertake a review of 
the Jamaica Civil Service. While praising Jamaica’s 'strong, uncorrupt civil service' as ‘a national 
asset of incalculable and fundamental value’, the resulting report warned of an existential threat to 
the Jamaica Civil Service if the service was unable or unwilling to be responsive to the demands of 
the elected politicians who comprised the government of the day.  
 
If this concept cannot be substantially realised in practice, ministers will inevitably be faced 
with the temptation to press for the appointment to positions of responsibility in the civil 
service of people who will in fact carry out their policies and plans, because of membership 
in the same political party or because they appear to the Minister to be more responsive to 
their own thinking and more active in seeing that things happen. People will be sought who 
are prepared to be wholeheartedly ‘involved’ in implementing the policy of the government 
of the day. It is the essence of democracy that the will of the people, expressed through the 
government of the day, should be carried out effectively, economically and promptly, and if 
a permanent career civil service cannot do it then other kinds of executive instruments must 
be developed.73 
 
 
72 Hamilton (n 23), 193. 
73 N C Angus. W P Barrett and E Holstein E, Public Administration in Jamaica (United Nations Commissioner 
for Technical Assistance Department of Economic and Social Affairs 1965), 1. Similar concerns were 
expressed in Trindad and Tobago at the time. See First Report of the Working Party on the Role and Status 
of the Civil Service in the Age of Independence, 1964. 
  
The result was a perceived lack of responsiveness which if not addressed would have exacerbated 
claims to greater representation, and prompted a search for alternative means of service delivery, 
further undermining the bargain. 
 
These tensions emerged gradually, but were somewhat muted by the overall ‘consensus’ politics in 
Jamaica throughout the 1960s. Politicians, such as future prime minister Edward Seaga, 
experimented with statutory boards to overcome the perceived lack of responsiveness by the 
existing public service.74 Others sought advice from particular civil servants in whom they had 
confidence, disregarding official channels of reporting and advice. However, severe strain emerged 
in the 1970s when the demand for representative politics (and a responsive public service) took a 
more radical turn.  
 
Democratic Socialism: PNP Administration 1972–1980 
 
In Jamaica, the election victory of the PNP in 1972 marked a turn towards a more radical 
politics, which by 1974 went under the name of ‘democratic socialism’. For then prime minister 
Michael Manley and the ruling PNP the civil service was perceived a conservative institution 
whose traditional emphasis on ‘neutrality’ was incompatible with their ambition (and what they 
saw as their democratic mandate) to transform society. Civil servants, it was contended, 
interpreted their role as ‘protector of the society from the whims, the fancies and the 
extravagancies of the politicians’.75 
 
A number of measures were taken to overcome this perceived resistance. First, the 
transformation of the public service was to be achieved through the establishment of a new 
 
74 E.g, the Urban Development Corporation Act 1968. 
75 Document submitted to the 1973 Peoples National Party Conference, ‘Jamaicanise Jamaicans’; see also 
Michael Manley The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament (Andre Deutsch, 1974), 205–6.  
  
Ministry of Public Service, which would transform the civil service through the introduction of 
modern administrative techniques. Members of the Public Service Commission, which had 
adopted a traditional approach to public sector appointments during the period between 1972 and 
1976 were replaced, following the 1976 election, by individuals more sympathetic to the ‘politics 
of change’ that Manley had sought to pursue, while its Chairman became a full time position. 
These new appointments were to establish the conditions for a public service that was more 
responsive to the needs of a developing country. But as well as seeking to make the civil service 
as it then existed more responsive, attempts were made, to a much greater degree than under the 
previous JLP government, to adopt much more responsive means for implementing the agendas 
of elected politicians. This involved successive government re-organisations. This involved not 
just the creation in 1973 of a Ministry of Public Service to oversee the adoption of contemporary 
administrative techniques; but also the Ministry of National Mobilisation and Human Resource 
Development in 1977 to coordinate and monitor the implementation of government policies and 
to act as a progress-chaser of other departments.76 In addition, the government of Manley 
pursued a number of strategies aimed at making public policies more responsive to what it saw 
as its popular mandate. 77 
 
Second, the PNP administration sought to identify those within the public service who were 
prepared to work with its agenda. As a 1973 party document put it, ‘[Government] must try to 
identify those civil servants who in spite of the screed of neutrality are nevertheless committed to 
the goals and actions of democratic socialism’. To this end, the Party created an ‘Accreditation 
Committee’ chaired by PNP Minister Robert Pickersgill in an attempt to ensure that key civil 
 
76 Government of Jamaica (1977) The Ministry of National Mobilisation and Human Resource Development: 
Its Nature, Structure and Functions. Ministry Paper 17 of 1977.  
77 Quoting Arnold Bertram, Patrick Bryan (n 69, 124) notes how these calls for greater responsiveness not 
just involved calls for greater social justice, but also appeals to the national business sector by advertising the 
supposed benefits of greater economic nationalism in contrast to foreign ownership.  
  
servants had not only the competence but the ‘commitment’ (as it was put by leading politicians 
at the time) to serve the government’s agenda. 
 
A fourth strategy was the appointment to the position of special advisors, a cadre of ideologically 
committed technical analysts, capable of providing an alternative to the civil service’s 
conventional monopoly on advice to Ministers. Such special advisors should be appointed by 
and solely to the Minister. “These cadres should not be integrated to the regular system. They 
must work outside of it.”78 The appointment of these ‘irregulars’ (as they were known) who had 
adopted different attitudes, mannerisms and even dress to traditional civil servants, often proved 
the antipathy of senior civil servants within.79 However, by the mid-1970s, there was also a 
growing stress on the importance of ‘competence’ among these ministerial advisors.  
 
Finally, the PNP government ramped up the strategy that started with Edward Seaga as Minister 
for Development and Welfare in the 1960s of creating statutory boards as vehicles for carrying 
out public policy. Again, however, by 1977, this strategy had been identified as problematic as 
these boards were diagnosed to have become unresponsive to political initiatives and 
‘bureaucracies in their own right’.  
 
Overall, the experience of the Manley Government in the 1970s reflects the concerns initially 
flagged by the United Nations Technical Department Report of 1965. Having embarked on a set 
of programmes aimed at transforming society, the Government found the Civil Service itself to 
be one of the obstacles to achieving this goal. The criticisms of politicians of the time, however, 
go beyond familiar grumbling about civil service intransigence. Instead, the very idea of 
‘neutrality’ was seen as incompatible with attempts at the mass mobilisation of society in pursuit 
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of developmental goals. At the same time, it illustrated considerable tensions even within that 
strategy: matching ‘competence’ (i.e. technical expertise to deliver programmes, to analyse 
policy options and such like) and ‘commitment’ (i.e. loyalty towards a democratic socialist party 
seeking to challenge existing domestic and foreign policies) inevitably led to conflicts, concern 
about leaks (for example, internal documents to the opposition leader) and accusations of 
outright sabotage (by supporting ‘capitalist’ organisations, such as the daily newspaper, the 
Gleaner, or US interests).  
 
This point represents the most extreme attempt in the post-independence period to ‘stretch’ the 
constitutional understanding towards a particular ideological version of representativeness. 
Subsequently, as in the wider global context, the 1980s were characterised by a return towards 
calls for a more ‘responsible’ form of government and therefore also understanding of the 
appropriate role between politics and civil service. Even though a further elaboration is outside 
the remit of this paper, subsequent waves of public service reform continued to be characterised 
by the continued presence of mutual suspicion between political and administrative elites, 
especially during times of changing government. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In his classic study of the political sociology of Jamaica in independence, Carl Stone links what 
he identifies as the key features of Jamaican politics, its organisation a series of patron-
clientelistic relations, with the paradoxical nature of political leadership, in which political 
leaders are seemingly all powerful, and yet uniquely vulnerable.  
 
The party boss or maximum leader is like a feudal monarch surrounded by a nobility who 
grow or diminish on scale of elite power depending on how he chooses to bestow favour. 
  
The maximum leader is able to keep the party together only if he constantly exerts 
personal authority over the party. The effective maximum leader can never be openly 
challenged, has the final word on most critical decisions (unless he chooses not to 
exercise that power), and is entrusted with the maximum power to determine policy and 
overall directions of the party. Maximum leaders who show signs of indecisiveness, 
weakness and lack of control invite challenges and lose credibility because the role of 
maximum leader is defined in the political culture as demanding strength, appearances of 
personal domination, and decisiveness.80 
 
This passage invites comparison with the position of the colonial-era Governor, who seemingly 
enjoyed a power that could avail to overcome all resistance that might be brought against him, 
yet had to maintain a fine balance between powerful opinion both locally and internationally.   
 
If the argument of this paper is correct, then such similarities are more than superficial. It 
suggests that an important constitutional legacy for Jamaica has been an ongoing tension 
between the competing constitutional principles of responsible and representative government. 
The lack of agreement as to how to reconcile notions of responsible and representative 
government, especially in relation to the relationship between political and administrative 
systems, has been a continual impediment to the development of strong political institutions. In 
particular the process of decolonisation gave rise to a ‘mutually suspicious bargain’ between 
national political and administrative elite.  
 
This persistence of a mutually suspicious bargain can be seen in a number of ways. First, it is 
reflected in the incoming political elite that, on the one hand, inherited the ambigious position of 
the governor, a supposedly responsible office that nevertheless was bound to be responsive to 
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select powerful interests, whether economic or electoral. On the other hand, this political elite 
encountered an administrative elite that had not only exchanged loyalty towards colonial 
government for social status in previous times, but that was also ill-equipped to deliver the kind 
of ‘representative’ programmes the new political elites, and their electoral constituencies 
demanded of them. This, in turn, reinforced the reliance on informal and indirect governing 
networks that are classically clientistic.  
 
Informal institutions are widely seen to stand side-by-side formal institutions. In this paper, we 
focus on the importance of informal institutions as enablers of formal constitutional rules and 
principles. We have highlighted the importance of informal institutions in providing for a degree 
of shared understanding regarding contested constitutional principles. Such an emphasis raises 
two wider issues. One is that formal constitutional systems are open to considerable degrees of 
change given changes in the way actors understand the ‘rules of the game’ and, in particular, the 
underlying informal understandings regarding tensions between constitutional principles. The 
persistence of a ‘mutually suspicious’ rather than ‘mutually beneficial’ bargain fundamentally 
affected and reinforced these tensions and fuelled political dynamics right throughout the initial 
period of independence. More generally, such a focus also highlights how problematic it is to 
rely on simplistic understandings of colonial governing that supposedly established the basis for 
subsequent infrastructures of administrative power. Instead, the legacy of (Crown colony) 
colonial government was ambiguity about how to govern, and the lack of ‘mutually beneficial 
understandings’ across actors in the political system created a persistent setting which disabled 
political, economic, let alone social development.  
